A recent perspective has argued that the phrase "Necessary and Sufficient," long a staple of 16 the genetics literature, has been misapplied in the context of neuroscience, and should be 17 abandoned (Yoshihara and Yoshihara, 2018). Here we rebut this proposal on both logical 18 and semantic grounds. We argue that the claim that "Necessary and Sufficient" is 19 "misapplied" in genetics and neuroscience rests on its narrow meaning in formal logic, in 20 which the phrase is used to define the properties of classes of objects. In genetics, however, 21
Introduction 28
For the last 70 years or so, geneticists have used the terms "necessary" and "sufficient" to refer to 29 the results of experiments in which the function of specific genes is either removed, or added. 30
The use of this terminology to describe loss-of-function (LOF) and gain-of-function (GOF) 31 manipulations has been central to genetic formal logic and scientific rigor. This language has also 32 been adopted, more recently, by systems neuroscientists to describe the results of experiments in 33 which neuronal function, rather than gene function, is either inhibited or increased, for example 34 using optogenetics (Zhang et al., 2010) . 35
Recently, it has been argued that the phrase "necessary and sufficient" is routinely 36 misapplied by biologists, i.e., is used in a manner inconsistent with its meaning in formal logic, 37 and therefore should be abandoned (Yoshihara and Yoshihara, 2018 ). The claim is that this is not 38 merely a matter of semantics, but rather one of logical rigor, and that the misapplication of this 39 term is misleading and dangerous. Here the authors (one a geneticist, the other a molecular 40 neuroscientist) respond to this criticism. 41
A conjunctive confound 42
Yoshihara and Yoshihara (2018) have argued against the use of the phrase "necessary and 43 sufficient" on both logical and semantic grounds. The logical argument is that in the conjunction 44 "necessary and sufficient," the word "and" implies logical equivalence, and that this is not the 45 case in its biological usage. In the illustrative example they provide ((Yoshihara and Yoshihara, 46 2018); Fig. 1A ), the properties of being a polygon with four equal sides and equal angles are 47 necessary and sufficient to describe a square. This equivalence implies full interconvertibility of 48 universal affirmatives describing squares: "all squares are polygons with four equal angles and 49 sides" implies that "all polygons with four equal angles and sides are squares." In other words, 50 any set of characteristics that are sufficient to exclusively define a class of objects are also 51 necessary. In this definitional usage, sufficiency always implies necessity. 52
In biology, however, this is not always the case. Some genes can be sufficient for a process, but 53 not necessary (if, for example, there are redundant genes controlling the same process; see Fig. 1 ). 54
If there are cases of sufficiency without necessity, the Yoshiharas argue, it means that "sufficient" 55 does not always imply "necessary," and therefore that the phrase "necessary and sufficient" no 56 longer retains its formal logical meaning in biology, and should be abandoned. 57
The problem with this argument is that the conjunctive phrase "necessary and sufficient" 58 is being applied in a definitional context (from Set Theory), in which the phrase refers to the 59 properties or characteristics of a defined object or category of objects. In contrast, in genetics theterm is used as a shorthand to describe the results of experiments designed to perturb a biological 61 process: a gene is "necessary" for a biological process if a loss-of-function (LOF) mutation in the 62 gene prevents the process from occurring; it is "sufficient" for the process if a gain-of-function 63 (GOF) mutation causes the process to occur in excess, or at a time or place when or where it 64 normally does not occur. 65
Not only are there cases where a gene can be sufficient but not necessary for a process to 66 occur (due to redundancy, as mentioned above), but there are also cases where a gene may be 67 necessary but not sufficient (e.g., because it is one of several genes that are all required in 68 combination for the process to occur). A Venn diagram describing the results of genetic 69 experiments of these types is illustrated in Figure 1 . Here, the overlap between the circles 70 describes those cases in which a gene is both necessary for a process and also sufficient for the 71 process to occur. But these two conditions are met in two different experimental conditions. 72 Therefore, they do not describe the characteristic properties of a gene (e.g., made of DNA, 73 double-stranded, specific nucleotide sequence, etc.); rather the results of experimental 74
manipulations. 75 76
As pointed out correctly by the Yoshiharas, fully interconvertible universal affirmatives are not 77 implied by cases of genes that behave as "necessary and sufficient:" the fact that gene a is . Genes a-d are necessary for process X (LOF manipulation blocks X), but not sufficient (GOF manipulation has no effect). Genes w-z are sufficient (GOF manipulation causes X), but not necessary (LOF manipulation has no effect). Genes r-t are necessary and also sufficient: both LOF and GOF manipulations have effects on X. sufficient for biological process X does not imply that all genes sufficient for process X are gene 79 a; nor does it imply that wherever gene a is expressed, process X must occur. Conversely, the 80 fact gene a is necessary for process X does not mean that no other genes are necessary for 81 process X other than gene a; nor does it imply that process X cannot occur without gene a under 82 some other experimental conditions. But the Yoshiharas argue that since fully interconvertible 83 universal affirmatives are implied by "necessary and sufficient" (in its definitional sense), the 84 phrase should not be used in biology because it is practically impossible to prove negatives (e.g., 85
one cannot prove that there are no genes other than a that are necessary for process X). 86
In a nutshell, therefore, the Yoshiharas are arguing that when geneticists use the phrase 87 "necessary and sufficient" to describe a gene, they are defining the properties of an object(s): the 88 genes are defined as "necessary and sufficient" for a given biological process. If that were correct, 89 then their criticism would be valid. However, as mentioned above geneticists do not use the 90 phrase in a definitional sense; rather they use it as shorthand to summarize the results of 91 experimental manipulations. Realizing that, the Yoshiharas fall back on the argument that even 92 though geneticists know and agree on what "necessary and sufficient" means in their field, since 93 the phrase might be confusing or misleading to someone from a different field (e.g., formal logic 94 or philosophy), it follows that biologists should stop using that phrase in their talks and 95
publications. 96
We respectfully disagree. There is no law that states that philosophers or logicians have a 97 monopoly on the usage of natural language that dominates over all fields of science. In our 98 experience, non-biologists either understand the language usage or ask for clarification. While we 99 share with the Yoshiharas an appreciation for precise language, we do not consider the phrase 100 'necessary and sufficient' imprecise or ambiguous when used in its biological sense. That 101 students' use of the phrase is found annoying to the Yoshiharas more likely reflects other aspects 102 of their scholarship, than logical inconsistency. 103 "Necessary and sufficient" in neuroscience: population vs. unit manipulations 104
An important issue raised by the Yoshiharas concerns the validity of adopting "necessary and 105 sufficient" terminology in circuit neuroscience. When this phrase is used by geneticists to 106 summarize LOF and GOF data, it refers to experiments performed on the same unit of 107 manipulation -i.e., the same gene. That is, to say that a given gene is "necessary and also 108 sufficient" for process X implies that the tests of necessity and sufficiency refer to the same 109 phenotypes (Yoshihara and Yoshihara, 2018) . Therefore in this type of experiment, the phrase 118 "necessary and sufficient" is understood to refer to the manipulated population, not to the 119 individual units within the population (Lin et al., 2011) . Formally, this ambiguity cannot be 120 resolved unless a single neuron is being manipulated in both the LOF and GOF experiments. 121
With the exception of C. elegans and fly larvae, there are very few cases where this single-cell 122 level of specificity is achieved -including the case of the single pair of interneurons that control 123 feeding in Drosophila (Flood et al., 2013) : even in that case, one could argue that activation of 124 only one of the pair of neurons is "sufficient" to initiate feeding, while inhibition of both neurons 125 is "necessary" to inhibit feeding. Therefore, the same unit (cell) is not certain to be both 126 "necessary and sufficient." While the Yoshiharas propose abandoning the term altogether in such 127 cases (Yoshihara and Yoshihara, 2018), given that the phrase is being used to summarize 128 experimental results, it seems simpler to just indicate that the neurons are "necessary and also 129 sufficient, as a population," for behavior X. 130 "Necessity" and "sufficiency" without conjunctivity 131
As described above, the logical aspect of the Yoshiharas' criticism boils down to the use of the 132 conjunctive term "necessary and sufficient," because of the formal equivalence of necessity and 133 sufficiency that "and" implies (in a definitional sense). One response to their criticism would be 134 to simply use the words "necessary" and "sufficient" in a non-conjunctive form, i.e., in separate 135 sentences, viz: "Gene a is necessary for process X. It is also sufficient for process X." There is 136 no "misapplication" of formal logic in this case. However, the Yoshiharas go a step further and 137 argue that the words "necessary" and "sufficient" are misleading in and of themselves, and 138 should be abandoned by biologists in favor of alternative words such as "indispensable" and 139
"inducing," respectively. 140
This is, however, a purely semantic argument, and as such it is a weak one. The objection to the 141 word "sufficient" is that a literal interpretation of the word implies that no other condition is 142 required in order to achieve the experimental result. Because these words are used by biologists 143 to describe the results of experiments performed in living organisms, it is of course implicitly 144 understood that the organism is required to observe the result. No biologists who states that "gene 145 a is sufficient for process X" means that a piece of DNA containing gene a floating in a test tube 146 full of water is sufficient for process X. Words and language are used in a context. If we restrict 147 the usage of words to contexts that are universal across fields of research, then we will greatly 148 impoverish our rich language. 149 This is not, however, to argue for imprecise language usage. We are all in favor of clarifying or 150 qualifying statements such as "gene a is sufficient when mis-expressed to cause precocious or 151 ectopic occurrence of process X," or "activation of cell type K is sufficient to trigger behavior Y 152 in the absence of other deliberate manipulations or conditions." Of course, it becomes 153 cumbersome to include such extra verbiage in abstracts or short communications. But to argue 154 that substituting "adequate," "causal," "inducing," "activating," "promoting" or any one of 155 dozens of other words is preferable to "sufficient," is not a question of formal logic, it is just to 156 argue in favor of one type of verbal shorthand over another. The same goes for substituting 157 "necessary" with words like "indispensable," "essential," "required," "requisite" or other 158 synonyms. It is a directive to send scientists to waste time poring over their dog-eared copies of 159 Roget's Thesaurus, scratching their heads. 160
Necessity and permissivity 161
The Yoshiharas go on to argue that the demonstration that a gene or cell is "necessary" for a 162 biological process is not even particularly informative, because it could reflect a relatively trivial 163 and indirect role for a gene in a process. For example, they cite a hypothetical case where the loss 164 of neurons that control leg movements might indirectly lead to a loss of aggressive behavior, by 165 "making the animal less energetic." 166 This is of course a valid possibility, but it confuses two distinct concepts in biology: necessary vs. 167 sufficient; and permissive vs. instructive. A gene is said to be "permissive," when it is required 168 for a process to occur, but when increasing its activity does not accelerate or enhance the process. 169 however a car with a full tank does not go any faster than one with half a tank. In contrast, the 171 accelerator pedal is "instructive," since pressing harder on it makes the car go faster. Similarly, 172 shifting the transmission into a different gear changes power output, and is also instructive, but in 173 a stepwise (discontinuous) rather than a continuous manner. Both the gas pedal and the 174 transmission, like fuel, have similar LOF phenotypes -the car doesn't run without them. GOF 175 manipulations are necessary to distinguish "instructive" from "permissive" functions. 176
Nevertheless, the fact that a gene may prove to be "permissive" does not mean that LOF 177 experiments are uninformative. The real question is whether a requirement for a given component 178 in a biological process reflects a direct, or indirect, role for that component. Further experiments 179
-not abandonment of certain types of experiments --are required to make that important 180
distinction. 181
The Yoshiharas further argue that the inability to demonstrate necessity -i.e., a negative result in 182 a LOF experiment -is not evidence that a gene or cell type is unimportant, because it could 183 reflect redundancy or compensation by other genes. We couldn't agree more. Negative results in 184
genetic LOF experiments are difficult to interpret, because they could reflect biological or 185 technical factors. We would argue the same for negative results in systems neuroscience 186 experiments, such as lesions. In particular, the relatively long time necessary for an animal to 187 recover from a surgical lesion or genetic ablation (days or weeks) can allow many compensating 188 mechanisms to engage (Hong et al., 2018) . Several comparative studies have shown that rapidly 189 reversible LOF manipulations (e.g, optogenetic inhibition) can yield phenotypes in cases where 190 lesions of the same structure do not (Goshen et al., 2011; Otchy et al., 2015) . Therefore, we 191 would argue that it is dangerous to conclude that a lesion of a brain structure that has no effect on 192 a function of interest implies that that structure does not contribute to that function, only that it 193 does not play an "essential" role (meaning one that is not redundant, or which cannot be 194 compensated by other structures or circuits). experiments, when they are in principle enabled by technology, are potentially useful, or do more 212 harm than good because they alter the system in unphysiological ways (Jazayeri and Afraz, 2017) . 213
Only time will tell. 214
In closing, we would like to point out that in contrast to most physical systems, biological 215 involve many interacting components that can produce evidence of correlated activity when 217 interrogated using sensitive methods. Such activity measurements (whether based on gene 218 expression, spiking rates or phosphorylation) can produce a wealth of phenomenological, 219 correlative data. However in the absence of causal data, it is extremely difficult to decide which 220 of these phenomena to study further, and therefore the risk of unproductively chasing an 221 observation that ultimately proves to be an epiphenomenon is high. Cancer researchers spent 222 decades searching fruitlessly for the mechanisms of oncogenic transformation, in cellular-level 223 phenomena such as changes in membrane fluidity or cytoskeletal organization, before genetic 224 tests were developed to identify oncogenes functionally (Weinberg, 1984) . Similarly, researchers 225 in the circadian rhythm field spent years studying oscillating genes and proteins that were simply 226 readouts of the biological clock, before Konopka and Benzer discovered the per genes that are 227 central to the circadian oscillator (Konopka and Benzer, 1971) . Experimental tests of necessity 228 and sufficiency are a critical first step, not a solution. As Jim Watson once said about the famous 229
Hershey-Chase experiment (Hershey and Chase, 1952) , which showed that hereditary 230 information in bacteriophage is carried by nucleic acids and not by proteins, such experiments 231 may not tell you what the answer is, but they show you where to look. 232
